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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the e⁄ects of risk preferences and attitudes towards risk on optimal
antitrust enforcement policies. First, we observe that risk aversion is negatively correlated with players￿
proclivity to form a cartel, and that increasing the level of ￿nes while reducing the probability of detection
enhance deterrence. This con￿rms that the design of an optimal law enforcement scheme must keep risk
attitudes into account, as suggested by Polinsky and Shavell [22].
We also notice that players￿propensity towards communication drops right after detection even if the
collusive agreement was successful, and it declines as the sum of the ￿nes paid by a subject increases.
This e⁄ect could be explained by availability heuristic [17] ￿a cognitive bias, where people￿ s perception
of a risk is based on its vividness and emotional impact rather than on its actual probability.
Our results also con￿rm the crucial role of strategic risk considerations [3] (analogous to risk dominance for
one shot games) in determining the e⁄ects of leniency programs. Indeed, we show that the e⁄ectiveness of
leniency programs in deterring cartels is mostly due to the increased risk of a cartel member being cheated
upon when entering a collusive agreement, while the risk of a cartel being detected by an autonomous
investigation of the Authority seems to play a less important role.
1 Introduction
This paper reports results from an experiment designed to examine the e⁄ects of ￿nes and of leniency
programs on ￿rms￿decision to form cartels (cartel deterrence). We consider an experiment in which subjects
play a repeated Bertrand price game with di⁄erentiated goods, running several treatments, which di⁄er in
the probability of cartels being caught, in the level of ￿ne and the possibility of self-reporting and getting
leniency.
Leniency policies, or programs, grant full or partial reductions of the sanctions to ￿rms that report hard
information about their cartel to the Antitrust Authority and cooperate with it along the prosecution phase,
helping to convict their former partners. These policies have been introduced in most OECD countries and
have become the main tool for cartel discovery and prosecution; their validity and e⁄ectiveness, though, is
hard to asses since in fact the number of undetected cartels is not observable. Therefore, it is only possible
to compare the number of detected cartels with and without leniency programs, but not the total number
of existing cartels, meaning that in principle an observed increase in convicted cartels could even be due to
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1an increase in cartel activity. For this reason, we think that an experimental approach is needed to collect
more evidence about leniency￿ s e⁄ects.
The results presented in this paper appear to be also relevant to the analysis of many other forms of
multi-agent organized crime ￿corruption, auditor-manager collusion, corporate crime in general ￿which
share with cartels some crucial features that well designed law enforcement programs may exploit 1. A ￿rst
important characteristic of these category of crimes is that cooperation among several agents is required
to perform the illegal activity, so that free riding, ￿hold-up￿ , and ￿moral hazard￿issues become relevant.
Moreover, the criminal activity takes the form of an ongoing relation, meaning that the membership of the
criminal organization produces ￿ ows of present and expected future bene￿ts and damages, instead of isolated
gains or losses. Finally, cooperating wrongdoers, by acting together, inevitably end up having information
on each others￿misbehavior that could be reported to third parties, which is the main characteristic that
could be exploited by leniency programs.
In this paper we don￿ t only investigate if, but also how leniency programs work. In particular, we try to
￿gure out which are the determinants of deterrence.
From a theoretical point of view, there are three conditions that have to be satis￿ed for a cartel to be formed.
First, the individual incentive to commit the crime must be strong enough, which means that the expected
utility it provides overcomes the expected disutility from the uncertain punishment. Second, the incentive
compatibility constraint must be satis￿ed; so the long run gains from sticking to the collusive agreement
must be higher than the short run gains from deviation plus its long run negative consequences. Third, the
level of trust among cartel￿ s members must be high enough: indeed we claim that the stability of a cartel
does not only depend on each member￿ s incentives to deviate, but also on the perceived risk of being cheated
upon by other members, or strategic risk, which increases as trust among cartel￿ s members decrease, and
also as the ￿sucker￿ s￿payo⁄ worsen. Strategic risk also a⁄ects cartelists￿ability to coordinate on the joint
pro￿t maximizing equilibrium. Indeed, if the level of perceived risk associated to it is too high, then they
could select a di⁄erent equilibrium, with lower incentives to deviate or better outcomes for the cheated upon
players in case a deviation takes place.
According to these considerations, the perceived risk of detection and trust ￿intended as the perceived
risk of being cheated upon ￿are two important drivers of individuals￿proclivity to collusion. In our study,
we analyze how di⁄erent legal frameworks impact on these two types of risk. In doing this, we also keep
into consideration the many ￿ndings in psychology and in behavioral and experimental economics which
show that the way people react to probabilities attached to risky outcomes departs in many ways from the
standard model of full rationality.
Our main results are that (i) deterrence is generally higher when leniency is granted to the whis-
tleblowers,(ii) a negative relation emerges between the sum of the ￿nes paid and participants￿willingness
to cooperate, and (iii) communication rates drop after conviction. Our analysis shows that strategic risk
and availability heuristic are among the main drivers of these three outcomes, even if they are generally
disregarded in the traditional approach to the study of law enforcement. In particular, strategic risk is
determinative both in explaining deterrence under Leniency treatments, and in justifying the drop in com-
munication rates after detection when a deviation took place. Availability heuristic and the salience of ￿nes,
on the other hand, are the most plausible reasons why players willingness to communicate decreases after
detection even if no deviation has previously taken place, as a fresh memory of the punishment increases the
perceived probability of detection. These behavioral biases also seem to motivate the negative e⁄ect exerted
by the sum of the ￿nes paid on participants￿willingness to cooperate.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the literature related with crime deterrence and with
the behavioral e⁄ects that might a⁄ect it. The experimental design and procedure are described in Section
3. Section 4 reports the results and explain the empirical methodology adopted to analyze our data, and




Individual bene￿ts and costs from criminal activities. Public enforcement of law is a widely in-
vestigated subject since 1968, when Gary Becker [2] published an article which was to become one of the
cornerstones of economic analysis of law.
Under Becker￿ s approach, then followed by many scholars such as Polinsky and Shavell [22], individuals are
fully rational utility maximizers, and so are o⁄enders. It is assumed that
a person commits an o⁄ense if the expected utility to him exceeds the utility he could get by using
his time and other resources at other activities. Some persons become ￿criminals￿ , therefore, not
because their basic motivation di⁄ers from that of other persons, but because their bene￿ts and
costs di⁄er.
According to this approach, the number of o⁄enses committed by a person can be related, be means
of a function, to the probability of conviction, to the punishment imposed in case of detection and to the
gains associated with the illegal activity: in practice, the potential o⁄ender will commit a crime only if the
expected utility attached to the crime￿ s outcome exceeds the expected (dis)utility of the possible sanction.
Organized Crime. As noticed by Spagnolo (2004) [26] and by Motta and Polo (2003) [21], when we
consider organized crime as opposed to individual crime, the balance between private bene￿ts and costs
from the o⁄ense cannot be the only determinant of the decision to commit it. Spagnolo states that ￿criminal
organizations su⁄er of an intrinsic ￿ governance problem￿since to curb moral hazard and ensure internal
cooperation they cannot rely on explicit contracts enforced by the legal system. For this reason, many
forms of organized crime must take the form of ￿or be conducted within ￿long-term dynamic criminal
relationships￿ . Such relationships can be modeled as repeated Prisoner￿ s dilemma like games, in which each
player is always tempted to ￿take the money and run￿ , and does not do that as long as the expected long
run gains from sticking to the illegal agreement overcome the short run gains from defection plus the long
run consequences that might result from it.
It is precisely on this balance that Leniency programs exert their deterrent e⁄ect: in absence of leniency,
reporting the crime to the authority is always a dominated action, while with a Leniency Program agents
may in fact ￿nd it convenient to report when they deviate from the criminal agreement, which can make
defection more desirable than adherence to the illegal organization.
Strategic risk According to the prevailing theory, an individual￿ s decision to cooperate ￿i.e. to take part
in a criminal agreement ￿is determined by the trade o⁄ between the consequences he expects from sticking
to the agreement and the anticipated outcome from deviation, but not by the consequences possibly yielded
by a deviation by some other member of the agreement.
In a recent paper Blonski and Spagnolo [4] critique this approach, suggesting that
real world agents do care about what would happen if other agents defected from the agreed
strategy pro￿le, and that these considerations should not be left out of our models.
They formalize the consequences of a variation in the sucker￿ s payo⁄ in a Prisoner￿ s Dilemma game,
and argue that a decrease in the cheated upon player￿ s payo⁄ increase the ￿strategic risk￿associated with
playing cooperatively, reducing the sustainability of cooperative equilibria in the long run. To sketch the
idea of strategic risk, consider an in￿nitely repeated PD game, whose stage game is represented in table 1:
According to the standard approach, the discouting factor required to sustain collusion must be higher than
a threshold value ￿, identi￿ed by the constraint:
r
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which can be rearranged as
￿
r ￿ p
1 ￿ ￿ | {z }
LR inc. to coop.
￿ t ￿ r |{z}
SR inc. to def.
:
where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the long-run incentive to cooperate, and the right-hand
side stands for the short-run incentive to deviate.
Strategic risk approach suggests that also the short run disincentive to cooperate (p ￿ s) matters, so the
appropriate threshold value for the discount factor is ￿
￿ > ￿, determined by:
￿
r ￿ p
1 ￿ ￿ | {z }
LR inc. to coop.
￿ t ￿ r + p ￿ s
| {z }
total SR inc. to def.
Bolnski and Spagnolo￿ s theoretical hypothesis has found some support in the experimental evidence recently
provided by Dal B￿ and Frechette [6], who study how the evolution of cooperation in in￿nitely repeated
prisoners dilemmas is a⁄ected by changes in the di⁄erence between the reward from cooperation and the
sucker￿ s payo⁄.
2.2 Behavioral Law and Economics
The models mentioned above proceed with the hypotheses of neoclassical economics, assuming individuals
to be perfectly rational expected utility maximizers. Empirical evidence collected by psychologists and by
experimental economists, though, casts some doubts about these assumptions: people￿ s behavior has been
proved to violate the classical paradigm of homo oeconomicus in many ways. More speci￿cally, according
to Jolls, Sustein and Thaler (1998) [16], human behavior departs from the standard conception of homo
oeconomicus under three main respects: they state that people display
￿ bounded rationality, in that they su⁄er from certain biases ￿such as overoptimism, mis-perception of
probabilities or self serving biases ￿and they adopt heuristics that lead to mistakes;
￿ bounded will power, which sometimes re￿ ects into myopic behavior;
￿ bounded self interest, meaning that they care for other people￿ s well being.
In light of these ￿ndings, they suggest that models of economic analysis of law that do not keep this
factors into account may lead to erroneous conclusions, therefore they develop and propose a new approach
to this branch of studies, ￿informed by a more accurate conception of choice, one that re￿ ects a better
understanding of human behavior and its wellsprings.￿
Since their seminal article, Behavioral Law and Economics has developed and has been applied to several
speci￿c topics in economic analysis of law (Jolls 2007, [15], and Garoupa 2003 [11] for a critical review).
In what follows, we will focus only on one aspect of bounded rationality: in particular we will consider how
a biased perception of risk may a⁄ect law enforcement.
Risk attitude Of the various behavioral aspect that might a⁄ect law enforcement, risk attitude and risk
perception are among the most important ones. Indeed, the e⁄ects of risk aversion were already mentioned
by Becker (1968) [2], who argues that, if players were risk neutral it would be possible to minimize the costs
of apprehension and conviction by lowering the probability of detection arbitrarily close to zero while rising
4the severity of the punishment, and states that this should be a fortiori true if o⁄enders were risk avoiders.
Notice that this is not only a theoretical matter, but it has strong policy implications which are currently
under debate within the Competition Authority of a European country.
Considerations about agents￿risk attitude are generally well integrated into the traditional approach to
economic analysis of law 2. But other aspects seem to be important too.
Heuristics and biases. Tversky and Kahneman (1979) [18] already observed that the way people react to
probabilities attached to risky outcomes departs in many ways from the basic tenets of expected utility theory:
they notice for example that individuals tend to overweight outcomes that are considered certain, relative
to outcomes which are merely probable (certainty e⁄ect); they also observe that agents round probabilities
or outcomes in order to simplify the analysis of risky prospects, and that ￿a particularly important form of
simpli￿cation involves the discarding of extremely unlikely outcomes.￿ On the other hand, they also suggest
that low probabilities are overweighted, meaning that people overreact to rare events but may underreact
to common ones. The interplay of the two last mentioned e⁄ects implies that ￿highly unlikely events are
either ignored or overweighted, and the di⁄erence between high probability and certainty is either neglected
or exaggerated.￿ This consideration clearly plays a role for the analysis of optimal law enforcement: indeed,
if a very small probability of liability is approximated to zero, then Becker￿ s argument claiming that it is
possible to reduce prosecution costs without a⁄ecting deterrence, by lowering the probability of detection
and harshening the penalties, does not hold anymore.
The weight attached by individuals to the risk of conviction may be also a⁄ected by another behavioral
bias: the salience e⁄ect. As highlighted by Akerlof (1998) [1], outstanding events and vivid information may
exert undue in￿ uence on decisions: he refers to this principle to explain time inconsistent decisions ￿arguing
that present costs and bene￿ts are salient if compared to future ones ￿and to provide a possible reason for
the ￿undue￿obedience to authority ￿which can emerge when disobedience is perceived as more salient than
compliance because it implies a deviation from the status quo or from a previous course of actions, and when
some degree of disutility is attached disobedience.
Similarly, one could argue that an exacerbation of punishments may increase deterrence since extremely
harsh penalties are more salient, than overweighted.
A close but di⁄erent behavioral e⁄ect concerning probability perception, foregrounded by Tversky and
Kahneman (1982) [17], is ￿availability heuristic￿ : a mechanism by which occurrences of events associated
with extremely high utilities or disutilities are perceived as being more frequent than they actually are. The
main di⁄erence between availability heuristic and salience is that according to the ￿rst one risk perception is
driven by memory-dependent mechanisms, while the second one states that attention is guided by the most
vivid present stimuli.
Availability heuristic has been tested and con￿rmed by Folkes (1988)￿ s studies on the risk perceived by
consumers when purchasing a product [10], and by a recent study by Keller et al. (2006) [19] on perception
of ￿ ood risk, which testi￿es that past experience of ￿ ooding increases risk perception independent on the
information exogenously provided about this risk. This piece of evidence supports the hypothesis that people
who experienced past ￿ ooding events and have of them images that are tagged with a⁄ect perceive the same
probability information di⁄erently from people without such memories.
Availability heuristic and salience can be interpreted as a result of the interplay of two fundamental ways
in which human beings comprehend risk: ￿risk as analysis and risk as feelings￿(Slovic et al., 2004 [25]),
the ￿rst one being based on the brain ￿analytical system￿￿which encodes reality in abstract and symbolic
terms, builds logical connections between events and requires logical or empirical justi￿cation for actions ￿
the second one being related to the ￿experiential system￿￿which on the contrary is associated with the
experience of a⁄ects, motivate actions on the basis of the emotional memory of related events and encodes
reality in concrete images, metaphors and narratives. The authors suggest that availability heuristic may
work because images and events that are tagged with a⁄ect are more easily recalled or imagined. Events that
are more sensational or salient are also more a⁄ectively charged, which might explain the overestimation of
their frequency or probability, both ex ante, before they are actually experienced by the subjects, and ex
2see, for example, Polinsky and Shavell (2000) [22]
5post, when individuals have memories associated with these events.
Empirical evidence As we have just seen, there are many psychological e⁄ects that might a⁄ect law
enforcement through the way people perceive the risk of being liable. Nonetheless, to our knowledge, the
empirical and experimental evidence collected to test the di⁄erent theoretical predictions in the speci￿c con-
text of crime deterrence is not very rich.
Levitt performed some interesting ￿eld studies about the actual relation between punishment and deterrence,
also keeping into account possible bias like criminals￿myopia or overoptimism (Levitt, 1998 [20]), but experi-
mental approach seems to be more suitable to analyze psychological motives behind peoples responses to legal
sanctions. In this second ￿eld of research, we should mention a study performed by Cason and Gangadharan
(2006) [5], who experimentally analyze a model of compliance developed by Harrington (1988) [12] in which
the enforcement agency modi￿es the inspection frequency and severities of the penalties depending on the
￿rms past compliance. They ￿nd that violation rate do not change as sharply as predicted by the model
when the probability of detection and size of the ￿ne change, and show that the observed behavior might
be captured by a quantal choice model, which accounts for boundedly rational decision making by allowing
individuals to make errors, assuming though that errors that are more costly are also less probable.
A second experimental work testing predictions of behavioral economics in the context of law enforcement
has been carried on by Jaquemet et al. (in press) [14], who study the role of optimism bias on the monit-
oring of illegal activities. They show that subjects exhibit a strong tendency to under-evaluate their own
likelihood of experiencing an unfavorable event as compared to the one of others, which leads to a lower level
of deterrence.
A third empirical work on punishment and deterrence has been recently presented by Fishman and Pope
(2006) [9]: they study punishment induced deterrence, i.e. ￿the subsequent deterrent e⁄ect [...] that actu-
ally experiencing punishment for a crime has on the speci￿c individual who was punished, conditioning for
changes in expected bene￿ts and costs of future criminal activity￿ . Using ￿eld data from the movie-rental
market, they explore the e⁄ect of having to pay a late fee on costumers￿movie-rental and movie-return
decisions, and show that:(i) experiencing punishment decreases the o⁄ender￿ s crime rate (in the short run);
(ii) salience (size and temporal proximity) of punishment is positively related with deterrence and (iii) the
e⁄ect does not vanish with experience.
Their results con￿rm that the experience of a penalty a⁄ects the weight individuals attach to punishment
when they have to decide whether to comply or not to a prescription, an e⁄ect that to us could be attribute
to the aforementioned availability heuristic.
Organized Crime and Trust. Assessing and evaluating the risk of liability is an important problem for
every potential o⁄ender, regardless the nature of his crime. When we focus on organized crime, though,
another signi￿cant element has to be taken into account, namely trust between members of the ￿criminal
organization￿ . Reciprocal trust is important for two reasons: ￿rst, as mentioned before, organized crime can
be modeled as a repeated prisoner￿ s dilemma like situation, in which each player will choose to stick to the
criminal agreement only if he has a strong enough belief that the other will do the same. Second, cooperating
wrongdoers, by acting together, inevitably end up having information on each others￿misbehavior that could
be reported to third parties, and each of the members of the organization has to be su¢ ciently con￿dent
that this will not happen.
Behavioral and experimental economics o⁄er a rich literature about trust; for sake of conciseness, we
cannot mention it all, and we will only cite one recent paper by Sapienza, Toldra and Zingales (2007) [23],
whose results are particularly interesting to us. They study a standard trust game and, among other things,
they ￿nd that a trusting behavior is determined by three main factors: beliefs about others trustworthiness,
risk aversion and other regarding preferences. Considerations about the third element are outside the scope
of our work, while the ￿rst two factors play a crucial role for the analysis of organized crime. The relation
between risk aversion and trust reveals that o⁄enders￿risk attitudes a⁄ect deterrence not only via the risk of
liability, but also because of the risk of betrayal on behalf of some other member of the criminal organization;
beliefs about others￿trustworthiness, on the other hand, appears to be even more important in repeated
6prisoner￿ s dilemma like games that they are in one shot trust games, since they a⁄ect the level of perceived
strategic risk, modifying the critical discount factor required to sustain the illegal agreement.
3 Experimental Design
In our experiment, each subject represented a ￿rm and played in anonymous two-persons group a repeated
duopoly game. In every stage game, the subjects had to take three types of decisions. First, the subjects
had to choose whether or not they wanted to form a cartel by discussing prices. Second, they had to choose
a price in a discrete Bertrand price game with di⁄erentiated goods. Third, the subjects could choose to
self report cartels to a competition authority. The attractiveness of this latter opportunity depended on the
details of the antitrust law enforcement institution - the treatment variables of our experiment.
3.1 The Bertrand game
In each period, the subjects had to choose a price from the choice set f0;1;:::;11;12g. Their payo⁄depended
on their own price choice and on the price chosen by their competitor and were reported in a payo⁄ table
distributed to the subjects. This table indicated a subjects￿pro￿ts depending on its own price choice and
the price chosen by its competitor (see ￿gure 1) and was derived from the following standard linear Bertrand
game. (The details of the Bertrand game were not described to the subjects.)
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where pi (pj) is the price chosen by ￿rm i (competitor j), a is a parameter accounting for the market size
and ￿ 2 [0;1) denotes the degree of substitutability between the two ￿rms￿products. Each ￿rm faced a
constant marginal cost, c, and had no ￿xed costs. The pro￿t function, ￿i(pi;pj), was thus given by
￿i(pi;pj) = (pi ￿ c)qi:
In our experimental setup, we chose a = 36, c = 0 and ￿ = 4=5 and restricted the subjects￿choice set
to f0;2;:::;22;24g. These parameters yield the payo⁄ table distributed to each subject. To simplify the
table we also relabeled each price by dividing it by 2 and rounded the payo⁄s to the closest integer. In
the unique Bertrand equilibrium, both ￿rms charge a price equal to 3 yielding per ￿rm pro￿ts of 100. The
monopoly price (charged by both ￿rms) is 9, yielding pro￿ts of 180. Note also that a ￿rm would earn 296
by unilaterally and optimally undercutting the monopoly price, i.e. by charging a price of 7. In this case
the other (cheated upon) ￿rm only earns a pro￿t of 20. Similarly, there are gains from deviating unilaterally
from other common prices than the monopoly price as well as associated losses for the cheated upon ￿rm;
in the range of prices in between the Bertrand price and the monopoly price, ie in the range f4;:::;8g, these
gains and losses are smaller than when a subject deviates unilaterally from the monopoly price.
3.2 Cartel formation
Throughout the experiment, the subjects could form cartels by discussing prices. At the beginning of
every period, a communication window opened if and only if both subjects agreed to communicate. This
communication stage, which is described in more detail below, was designed in such a way that it would
result in a common price on which to cooperate. This agreed upon price was non-binding, however, and
therefore each subject could cheat on the agreement by subsequently charging a price di⁄erent from the
agreed upon price.
Whenever two subjects chose to communicate, they were considered to have formed a cartel. In this case,
the subjects risked to be ￿ned as long as their cartel was not detected by the competition authority. This
implied that two subjects could be ￿ned in a period even if no communication took place in that speci￿c
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8period; for example, two subjects could be ￿ned in a period in which they did not communicate if they
communicated in the previous period and the competition authority did not detect the associated cartel in
that period. Once a cartel was detected, however, it was considered to be dismantled and in subsequent
periods, the former cartellists did not run any risk of being ￿ned unless they communicated again.
3.3 Treatment variables
Whenever two subjects had formed a cartel, a competition authority could detect the cartel and convict
its members for price ￿xing. Detection could happen in two ways. First, in every period, the competition
authority detected cartels with an exogenous probability, ￿. If this happened, both cartel members had to
pay an exogenous ￿ne, F. Second, the cartel members could self-report the cartel, in which case the cartel
members were convicted for price ￿xing with certainty. If this happened, the size of the ￿ne depended on
the details of the law enforcement institution.
We ran eight treatments of our game, adopting a between subjects design, so that every subject only
played the game under a single treatment. The six treatments di⁄er in the speci￿c type of antitrust law
adopted (with or without leniency for those who report the cartel), in the probability of detection and in
the size of the ￿ne imposed to the detected cartels￿members. The di⁄erences between the treatments are
summarized in table 2.
Treatment ￿ne (F) probability report report￿ s
of detection (￿) e⁄ects
Antitrust
200 0.10









Communication 0 0 No ￿
Table 2: Treatments
Antitrust Policy. Our baseline treatment corresponds to a laisser faire regime and is denoted Commu-
nication: in this treatment, ￿ = F = 0 so that forming a cartel by discussing prices is legal. To simplify
the instructions and to eliminate irrelevant alternatives, subjects were not allowed to report cartels. In the
￿ve other treatments cartel members were allowed to report cartels in which they participated. The Anti-
trust treatments corresponds to traditional antitrust laws without any leniency program: in case a report
took place, both cartel members (including the reporting one) had to pay the full ￿ne F. The Leniency
treatments corresponds to current antitrust laws embedded with a leniency program: in case the cartel was
reported by one of the cartel members only, the reporting member paid no ￿ne while the other one paid
the full ￿ne, F; if instead both cartel members reported the cartel simultaneously, both paid a reduced ￿ne
equal to F=2. Note that under Leniency treatments a player who decides to deviate from the agreement
is always better o⁄ if he simultaneously reports the cartel. So, in principle, the introduction of Leniency
Programs should tighten the incentive compatibility constraint, since deviating becomes less risky, thus more
attractive. Leniency should also harshen strategic risk, because the cheated upon ￿rm not only su⁄er for
the exploitation, but also has to pay the ￿ne for sure.
Probability of Detection and Size of the Fine We also vary the probability of detection and the size
of the ￿ne across treatments: in particular, per each of the two considered antitrust policies, we have two
treatments with an expected ￿ne of 20 ￿one with a high probability of detection (￿ = 0:10) and a low ￿ne
9(F = 200), the other in which, vice versa, the probability of detection is low (￿ = 0:02) and the ￿ne is high
(F = 1000) ￿and one treatment in which the expected ￿ne is higher: ￿ = 0:2 and F = 300.
A di⁄erent mix of magnitude and probability of the ￿ne a⁄ects the riskiness of the collusive outcomes, but, as
discussed above, it is not obvious what kind of e⁄ect this could generate in terms of deterrence. For example,
if agents are perfectly rational and risk neutral, and they do not react to strategic risk, their preferences
should be only marginally a⁄ected by a change in the determinants of the ￿ne which leaves the expected ￿ne
constant. Such a change, in fact, has no impact on the expected collusive pro￿ts and has at most a marginal
e⁄ect on the pro￿tability of a deviation from collusion. As suggested by Becker, if on the contrary agents
are risk averse we should observe higher deterrence when the size of the ￿ne is higher and the probability
lower, whether leniency programs are present or not. In addition, under Leniency Programs an increase of
the magnitude of the ￿ne dramatically reduces the pro￿t a ￿rms obtains when ￿cheated upon￿ , that is when
their opponent deviates from the collusive agreement. As mentioned above, these pro￿ts play no role in the
standard theory, since they do not a⁄ect the conditions for an agreement being supportable in equilibrium,
but they do matter for strategic risk, because they enter the de￿nition of the short run disincentive to
cooperate. Moreover, all the behavioral biases a⁄ecting risk perception we enumerated above might play a
role in determining the outcome of such changes in the components of the expected ￿ne.
The experiment we present here was not speci￿cally designed to test any of these theoretical predictions,
but to investigate the e⁄ects of di⁄erent legal settings in light of them. With the same exploratory aim, we
designed two additional treatments ￿ one with Leniency, one without it ￿in which the ￿ne is high (F = 1000),
but can be in￿ icted only in case of reporting because the probability of detection is set to be null (￿ = 0):
that is, the antitrust authority is not able to discover any cartel that is not reported by at least one of its
members. Comparing the results of these treatments with those we get from the corresponding treatments
where the size of the ￿ne is the same (F = 1000) but the probability of detection is positive (￿ = 0:02), we
can study if a very small probability of detection is overweighted or underestimated, and we can also check
for the role played by strategic risk in this setting. Indeed, if strategic risk did not a⁄ect players￿decision,
we should not observe any deterrence in the treatment with ￿ = 0.
3.4 Experiment￿ s timing and rematching procedure
At the end of each period, subjects were rematched with the same competitor with a probability of 85%.
With the remaining probability of 15%, all subjects were randomly matched into new pairs. When this
happened, cartels formed within the previous match could not be ￿ned anymore. The experiment lasted
at least 20 rounds. From the 21st round on, we introduced a termination probability of 15%, while the
probability of rematching was reduced to 0. Subjects were also informed that the game would have been
stopped in case the experiment lasted for more than 2 hours and 30 minutes. This latter eventuality never
took place.
This re-matching procedure had several advantages. First, the subjects were playing truly in￿nitely
repeated games without problems associated with end e⁄ects. Second, each subject played several repeated
games against di⁄erent competitors, which allowed us to observe the subjects￿behavior in a larger number
of repeated games.
Before the experiment started, the subjects were paired with the same competitor for ￿ve practice periods.
Participants were informed that during these practice periods, they were paired with di⁄erent competitors
than those that they faced in the ￿rst period of the ￿ true￿(i.e. remunerated) experiment. They were also
told that pro￿ts realized during the trial periods were not to a⁄ect their earnings from the experiment.
3.5 The timing of the stage game
In the Antitrust and Leniency treatments, a stage game consisted of 7 steps (see ￿gure 2). In the
Communication treatment steps 4,5 and 6 were skipped.
We will now describe more in details each single step.
Step 1: Communication decision. Each subject was asked whether or not he wished to communicate
10Figure 2: Stage game
with his competitor. If both subjects pushed on the yes button within 15 seconds, the game proceeded to
step 2. Otherwise the two subjects had to wait for an additional 30 seconds before pricing decisions were
taken in Step 3. In all periods, subjects were also informed whether they were matched with the same
opponent as in the previous round or if a re-match had taken place.
Step 2: Communication. If both subjects decided to communicate in step 1, a window appeared on their
computer screen asking them to simultaneously state a minimum acceptable price in the range f0;:::;12g.
When both of them had chosen a price, they entered a second round of price negotiations, in which they
could choose a price from the new range fpmin;:::;12g, where pmin was de￿ned as the minimum among the
two prices selected in the previous negotiation round. This procedure went on until 30 seconds had passed.
The resulting minimum price pmin was referred to as the agreed upon price.
Step 3: Pricing. Each subject had to choose his price from the choice set f0;:::;12g. Possible price
agreements reached in step 2 were not binding. The subjects were informed that if they failed to choose a
price within 30 seconds, then their default price would be so high that their pro￿ts became 0.
Step 4: First Reporting Decision. If communication took place in the current period or in one of
the previous periods and had not yet been discovered by the competition authority, subjects had a ￿rst
opportunity to report the cartel.
Step 5: Market prices and second reporting decision. Subjects were informed about the prices
set by their opponent, their own pro￿ts and the pro￿ts of their competitor, gross of the possible ￿ne. If
communication had taken place in the current period or in one of the previous periods and had not not
yet discovered by the competition authority and nobody had reported it in step 4, subjects had again the
opportunity to report the cartel. The crucial di⁄erence between this second reporting opportunity and the
￿rst one is that the subjects knew the price chosen by their competitors.
Step 6: Detection. If communication took place in the current period or in one of the previous periods
and had not yet been discovered or reported in steps 4 or 5, the competition authority discovered the cartel
with probability ￿.
Step 7: Summary of the current period. At the end of each period, all the relevant information about
the stage game are displayed: agreed upon price (if any), prices chosen by the two players, possible ￿nes and
net pro￿ts. In case players were ￿ned, they were also told how many players reported.
Note that with our experimental setup subjects have two opportunities to report the cartel: ￿rst at step
4, right after having set their price, then again at step 5, after having been informed about the price chosen
by their opponent. In our design, reporting can thus be used for two di⁄erent purposes: (i) deviating subjects
may report to get protection against prosecution and (ii) cheated upon subjects may report to punish their
opponents, if they have not reported before.
3.6 Measuring risk aversion
We needed also a measure of risk aversion, to check for the e⁄ects it has on subjects￿decision to communicate;
due to the length of our main game, though, we could not adopt the ￿now standard ￿ten paired lotteries
choice proposed by Holt and Laury (2002) [13], which is too time consuming, and we chose a shorter
procedure, which provided us with a less precise but still reliable proxy.
At the end of the main game, each of the subjects was presented the following situation: given an initial
endowment of 25 Euro they were asked to choose how much to keep and how much to invest into a risky
11project, yielding a return equal to 2.5 with 50% probability, and a return equal to 0 otherwise. After all the
answers had been collected, a coin was tossed to determine the outcome of the risky project and only one of
the subjects was randomly drawn to be paid according to his choice. It was made clear to the subjects that
their choice and earnings in this second game could not a⁄ect in any way the pro￿t they had made in the
previous game.
Note that the initial endowment was chosen so that the amount of money at stake had approximately the
same magnitude than the average cumulated pro￿t in the main game: the amount of money invested should
then be a reliable proxy of the degree of risk aversion displayed by the subjects when playing the Bertrand
game.
3.7 Experimental procedure
Our experiment took place in May 2007 at Tor Vergata University (Rome, Italy) 3. Session lasted on average
2 hours, including instructions and payment. We ran all the eight treatments and the investment game to
check for risk attitude, involving 282 students in total. The average payment in the main game was equal to
23.60 e, with a maximum of 34eand a minimum of 11e, while the average payout for the investment game
was 30.33e, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 62.5e.
For some of the results, we will present also data collected within the same experimental project, in March
and April 2007 at the Stockholm School of Economics (Sweden). In Stockholm we did not run the investment
game, while the Bertrand game was exactly alike the one we did in Rome. We ran only 5 treatments in
Stockholm, namely: Communication plus the two Leniency and two Antitrust treatments in which the
expected ￿ne is equal to 20. 78 students were involved, in all. The average payment in Stockholm SEK 2484,
with a minimum of 130 SEK and a maximum of 330 SEK.
The experiment was computerized, and the programs were written with z-tree [8]. At the beginning of
each session, subjects were welcomed in the lab and seated, each in front of a computer. When all subjects
were ready, a printed version of the instructions and the pro￿t table was distributed to them. Instructions
were read aloud to ensure common knowledge of the rules of the game. The subjects were then asked to
read the instructions on their own and ask questions, which were answered privately. When everybody had
read the instructions and there were no more questions (which always happened after about ￿fteen minutes),
each subject was randomly matched with another subject for the ￿ve practice rounds. After the practice
rounds, participants had a last opportunity to ask questions about the rules of the game. Again, they were
answered privately. Then they were randomly rematched into new pairs and the real game started.
At the end of each session, the subjects were paid privately in cash. The subjects started with an initial
endowment of 1000 points in order to reduce the likelihood of bankruptcy. At the end of the experiment the
subjects were paid an amount equal to their cumulated earnings (including the initial endowment) plus a
show up fee of 50 SEK in Stockholm and 7 Euros in Rome. The conversion rates were 20 points for 1 SEK
in Stockholm and 200 points for 1 Euro in Rome.
4 Results
In this section, we will ￿rst present some aggregate results: we will brie￿ y analyze the data collected through
the investment game, and we will compare the average rate of communication in the di⁄erent treatments.
We will then study what are the drivers of the subjects￿decision to communicate, according to the results
we got from a logit regression.
In the last part we will focus on the e⁄ects of conviction on players￿behavior, analyzing how their willingness
to communicate changes after they had got ￿ned.
3Treatment Antitrust with ￿ = 0 and F = 1000 was run in an additional session, taking place at Tor Vergata University in
December 2007. Students having taken part to previous sessions were not admitted.
4At the time of the experiment, 1 SEK=0.109 Euro
12Figure 3: Distribution of investment choices
4.1 A proxy for risk aversion
Figure 3 displays the distribution of choices in the investment game: we ￿nd that more than 20% of the
players are risk neutral or risk lover, which is in line with Holt and Laury (2002)￿ s ￿ndigs; consistently with
most empirical and experimental ￿ndigns (see Eckel and Grossman, in press [7]) we also observe that women
invested signi￿cantly less than men: the correlation between gender and investment is 21.65%, (signi￿cant
at the 0.1%).
4.2 The decision to communicate under di⁄erent treatments
Table 3: Communication decision rates under di⁄erent treatments
￿ F Antitrust Leniency
0.1 200 0.59 0.34
0.02 1000 0.38 0.25
0.2 300 0.45 0.43
0 1000 0.54 0.28
Communication 0.78
Data collected in Rome. 5026 observations in total.
Here we present an overview of our results about how the legal framework a⁄ects the individual decision
of taking part in a cartel, when this choice is illegal and risky. Notice that in our setting, communication is
13risky only when subjects are not currently cartel members, because the decision to communicate again when
a cartel has already been established does not a⁄ect the probability of detection, nor the punishment imposed
in case of liability. For this reason, for Antitrust and Leniency treatments, we restrict our attention to the
attempts of communicate made by subjects that are not already members of a cartel. Comparing the rate
of communication decision observed under the six Antitrust and Leniency treatments with those obtained
in the benchmark treatment, Communication, we can evaluate the success of di⁄erent legal frameworks in
terms of ex ante deterrence, that is the main objective of Antitrust policies. A ￿rst look at these data leads
to some preliminary observations:
￿ A large increment in the actual ￿ne increases deterrence
￿ A large increment in the expected ￿ne does not increase deterrence
￿ Given ￿ and F, deterrence is higher under leniency
￿ When ￿ = 0 deterrence does not drop under leniency, but it does under antitrust.
To assess the signi￿cance of these results and to individuate the drivers of the communication decision,
we need to study our data more in detail, taking into account some technical aspects of our dataset that
make the econometric analysis less straightforward, as we shall explain in next paragraph.
4.3 Empirical methodology
A critical point in our analysis is how to control for repeated observations of the same subject or the same
duopoly, when testing the signi￿cance of the observed di⁄erences across treatments. Given the rematching
procedure we adopted, we need to account for correlation between two observations from the same individual,
as well as correlation between two observations from di⁄erent individuals who belong to the same duopoly.
Moreover, since the experiment was run in two di⁄erent cities, when we pool together the data gathered in
Rome and Stockholm we also have to control for the possible correlation among observations collected in
the same city. To this purpose, we adopted multilevel random e⁄ect models.
Since in our experiment a subject may take part in more than one duopoly during the game, the random
e⁄ects at the subject level and at the duopoly level are not nested, which makes it di¢ cult to estimate a
model with a random e⁄ect at the duopoly level and a random e⁄ect at the subject level at the same time.
To overcome this complicacy, we hypothesized the presence of a random e⁄ect for every subject within
any particular match (which accounts for the correlation among observations pertaining to the same match),
nested with a random e⁄ect for every subject across di⁄erent matches, which is in turn nested with a random
e⁄ect at the city level.
To analyze data collected both in Rome and in Stockholm, we adopt a four-levels random intercept logit
model of the following form:







where h, i , j and k are indices for measurement occasions, subjects in matches, subjects across matches and
cities, respectively. CommDechijk represents the h￿th communication decision of subject j in match i, and
in city k. xhijk is a vector of explanatory variables (including the constant), with ￿xed regression coe¢ cients
￿; ￿
(2)
ijk represents the random intercept for subject j in match i, and in city k (second level), ￿
(3)
jk represents
the random intercept for subject j in city k (third level) and ￿
(4)
k represents the random intercept for city
k (fourth level). Random intercepts are assumed to be independently normally distributed, with a variance
that is estimated through our regression.
When comparing observations collected in a single city, we adopt a model which is analogous to the
previously described one, but without the last level.
To estimate our model used GLLAMM 5, a software speci￿cally designed to provide a maximum likelihood
framework for models with unobserved components, such as multilevel models, certain latent variable models,
panel data models, or models with common factors.
5see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2004 [24] and http://www.gllamm.org
144.4 Drivers of the decision to communicate
In this section we present the results of a logit regression we ran to assess which are the most important
factors a⁄ecting subjects￿decision to communicate. For these results, we only consider the data we collected
in Rome, therefore we will adopt a three levels random intercept logit model of the form presented above.
Table 4 presents the results of this regression6.
Table 4: Results of the logit regression.









Paid ￿ne (/1000) -1.048*** 0.216
Frequency of detection -0.073 0.598
Cumulated earning (/1000) -0.002 0.083




Data collected in Rome. 5026 observations in total.
The dependent variable is the decision to communicate: as mentioned before, since we are interested in
deterrence of cartel formation, we do not consider in this regression the decisions taken by subjects already
members of an existing cartel.
The independent variables are:
￿ 8 dummy variables, one for each treatment (communication is the benchmark)
￿ the total ￿ne paid by the subject up to the period in which he takes the decision.
￿ the frequency of detection observed by the subject, measured as the ratio between the number of times
a cartel he belonged to was detected by the Authority (without it being reported) and the number of
periods in which the subject had taken part in a cartel.
￿ the subject￿ s cumulated earnings.
￿ the amount of money put into the risky asset in the ￿investment game￿
Note that the cumulated ￿ne and cumulated earnings have a much higher magnitude than the other
regressors; for this reason, we divided those numbers by 1000, so that all the variables had approximately
the same scale. For similar reasons, the sum chosen by the subject in the investment game enters the equation
in terms of ratios of the total amount of money available, namely 25.
The regression￿ s results substantially con￿rm our preliminary observations.
6Note: In this table as well as in the following results, the symbols ￿￿￿; ￿￿ and ￿ indicate signi￿cance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
15Result 1: the size of the actual ￿ne matters. Deterrence is signi￿cantly higher when actual ￿ne is
higher, the expected ￿ne being the same. According to one-sided z-tests, we have:
A0:02;1000 <￿￿ A0:1;200 and L0:02;1000 <￿ L0:1;200
Result 2: the size of the expected ￿ne has no direct e⁄ect on deterrence. A higher expected ￿ne
does not necessarily imply higher deterrence:
A0:1;200 >￿￿ A0:2;300 and L0:1;200 ￿ L0:2;300
but
A0:02;1000 ￿ A0:2;300 and L0:02;1000 <￿￿￿ L0:2;300
These ￿rst two results seem to con￿rm Becker￿ s suggestion that it is possible to achieve higher deterrence
while decreasing prosecution costs by increasing the size of the ￿ne and reducing the e⁄ort spent in invest-
igation.
Result 3: deterrence is generally higher under Leniency. Only for the two treatments with higher
expected ￿ne (￿ = 0:2 and F = 300) the e⁄ect does not seem to be signi￿cant:
L0:1;200 <￿￿￿ A0:1;200
L0:02;1000 <￿￿ A0:02;1000
L0:2;300 ￿ A0:2;300L0;1000 <￿￿￿ A0;1000
Result 4: deterrence when ￿ = 0. As mentioned before, according to the standard theory we should not
observe any deterrence when the probability of detection is null. Indeed, we notice that the coe¢ cient
for A0;1000 is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Remarkably, a di⁄erent result holds for Leniency
treatments: a small probability of detection seems to play no role in deterrence under Leniency, when
the ￿ne is high enough:
L0:02;1000 ￿ L0;1000
Currently, some concern has been expressed about the contingency that the many leniency applications
keep the agency busy with prosecution, to the detriment of investigation; thus, the probability that a cartel
is detected because of the autonomous investigation by the authority would decrease (lower ￿.)
According to our results, this should not be a serious problem: we observe that deterrence remains high even
if ￿ = 0, provided that the ￿ne is high enough.
Now we would like to examine these results in light of the theories about players￿behavior mentioned in
section 2, to see if and to which extent these theories are supported by the evidence we collected.
Risk aversion. Our regression shows that subjects who chose to put more money in the risky lottery of
the investment game are also more incline to communicate, which is in line with the ideas discussed in section
2.2. There, we have seen that risk aversion can a⁄ect deterrence in at least two ways: ￿rst, it increases the
perceived dis-utility connected to the risk of conviction; second, it can also worsen the perceived risk of being
betrayed by the other player, in case a cartel is established. A certain degree of risk aversion in some of
the players is also a possible reason why deterrence is higher in treatments A0:02;1000 and L0:02;1000 than in
treatments A0:1;200 and L0:1;200, respectively, even if the expected ￿ne remains constant.
Strategic risk. We do not observe any signi￿cant di⁄erence between the levels of deterrence under Leni-
ency when the ￿ne is high (F = 1000) and the probability of detection is low or null. This fact supports the
idea that in presence of leniency programs it must be the risk of being cheated upon by the other cartelist
￿i.e. strategic risk ￿and not the risk of being liable that determines deterrence. In treatments Antitrust,
16on the other hand, we observe that deterrence when the probability of detection is low but positive is signi-
￿cantly higher than when this probability is null. Moreover, the estimated coe¢ cient for treatment dummy
A0;1000 is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. This is not in contrast with the theory of strategic risk. In
fact, both ￿ndings suggest that it is the risk of detection and punishment ￿and not the risk of being betrayed
by other cartelists ￿that discourage players from colluding, when no leniency is granted to those who report
the cartel. In fact, in this case reporting the cartel when deviating from the collusive agreement is not a
dominant strategy, so it is possible that the perceived strategic risk is lower and may even be negligible when
there is no risk of detection.
Perception of small probabilities. We mentioned above that according to the research developed by
Tversky and Kahneman [18], the perception of very small probabilities may have ambiguous outcomes: it
is possible that they are overemphasized or even approximated to zero, depending on the context and on
the individual characteristics of the subject. The signi￿cant di⁄erence between the estimated coe¢ cients
for A0;1000 and A0:02;1000 seems to imply that in general, in our game a very small probability of detection
is not disregarded. In a sense, this is another element supporting the importance of strategic risk in the
situation we depicted. In fact, the di⁄erence in deterrence disappears under the two Leniency treatments
with ￿ne equal to 1000. If players do not approximate a probability of 2% to zero, then this proability must
be disregarded because other factors predominate, and among them strategic risk appears to be one of the
most plausible.
Availability heuristic. The hypothesis that people￿ s perception of a risk is based not only on its actual
probability, but also on its vividness and emotional impact is validated by our data. According to our
regression, the sum of the ￿nes paid by a subject in previous periods has a signi￿cant and substantial
negative e⁄ect on his willingness to communicate, meaning that subjects who have paid a very high ￿ne,
but also those who have repeatedly paid a lower ￿ne, are less incline to collude again. This is in line with
the ￿ndings of Fishman and Pope (2006) [9] about punishment-induced deterrence and with the idea that
the experience of the penalty a⁄ects subjects￿willingness to commit the crime, the more the harsher is the
penalty, or more generally the stronger is its memory.
The sum of the ￿nes paid appears to be the only factor a⁄ecting players behavior throughout the game, thus
introducing some dynamics in their choice pattern. Communication decision does not seem to be a⁄ected
by the player￿ s cumulated earnings, which is obviously highly correlated with the number of periods elapsed
since the beginning of the game and of the match. This seems to rule out an endowment e⁄ect, and any
learning e⁄ects other than the one deriving from the experience of punishment.
4.5 Post-conviction Behavior
In this section we will describe how players modify their decision to communicate in the periods following
conviction. First, we introduce a distinction between two categories of conviction, according to the outcome
they generate for the players in terms of payo⁄s: we will say that conviction has a
￿ symmetric outcome, if it hurts both players (approximately) in the same way. For example, this is
the case when a cartel is detected by the Authority, but also when reporting is used as a punishment
device under Leniency. In this last case, only one of the players deviated from the collusive agreement,
thus getting higher pro￿ts, but the the cartel was reported only by the other player: both players then
obtain low pro￿ts, because one of them was cheated upon, the other one got ￿ned.
￿ asymmetric outcome, if one of the cartel￿ s members got hurt more than the other, as when only one
player deviate and simultaneously reports the cartel.
In this section we use data collected both in Rome and in Stockholm, since we are not going to use the
information about subjects risk aversion. We will also pool together the data across treatments.
First, we observe that conviction has a symmetric outcome 94.12% of the time under Antitrust treatments,
and only 37.90% of the times under Leniency. This is mainly due to the fact that deviators often report
17Figure 4: Post-conviction rate of communication decision.
the cartel to protect themselves from ￿nes under Leniency, but not under Antitrust: indeed, under Leniency
treatments, players who undercut the agreed upon price also reported the cartel in 62.38% of the cases, while
under Antitrust treatments this percentage drops to 4.95%. So, if conviction with asymmetric outcomes
discourages communication more, then we would have at least a partial explanation of why we generally
observe more deterrence under Leniency treatments.
Figure ?? displays the percentage of convicted agents (vertical axis) who chose to communicate again in
the ￿ve periods following conviction (horizontal axis), separately for symmetric and asymmetric conviction
outcomes. We observe that, as a consequence of asymmetric conviction, most of the subjects decide not to
communicate anymore with the same competitor, while the about one subject out of two chose to commu-
nicate again when conviction￿ outcome was symmetric.
To check whether this ￿nding is signi￿cant and robust to other factors, we ran the following four levels
random intercept logit regression:
CommDechijk = ￿0 + ￿1CumEarningshijk + ￿2Finehijk + ￿3Symmhijk+







where, the dependent variable is communication decision in the period immediately following conviction,
CumEarnings represents the cumulated earnings of the subject, Symm is a dummy variable equal to
1 when the outcome of conviction was symmetric, Fine measures the ￿ne actually paid by the convicted
subject, and SymmXFine represents the interaction between these two factors. Finally, as explained before,
￿
(2)
ijk represents the random intercept for subject j in match i, and in city k (second level), ￿
(3)
jk represents
the random intercept for subject j in city k (third level) and ￿
(4)
k represents the random intercept for city k
(fourth level).
The results of this regression, displayed in table 5 show that symmetry of conviction outcomes positively
and signi￿cantly a⁄ects subjects￿decision to communicate after conviction. Columns three, four and ￿ve of
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Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
Cumulated Earnings 0.144 0.140
(0.127) (0.126)
Fine 1.017* 0.778* 0.650
(0.548) (0.431) (0.412)
Symmetry 0.780*** 0.655*** 0.668*** 0.684***
(0.265) (0.197) (0.196) (0.193)
SymmXFine -0.545
(0.768)
Constant -1.241*** -1.182*** -0.886*** -0.723***
(0.347) (0.337) (0.200) (0.165)
LogLikelihood -452.397 -452.648 -453.268 -454.551
#obs. 692 692 692 692
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
the table present the estimation results for the reduced models obtained progressively deleting the factors
the turned out not to be signi￿cant, according to loglikelihood-ratio tests at the standard 5% signi￿cance
level.
Noticeably, even when the outcome of conviction is symmetric, only half of the convicted subjects decide
to communicate again. Part of this e⁄ect is due to the fact that most of the collusive agreements had
Table 6: Communication rate when conviction outcome is symmetric
rate of comm. N. obs.
broken 46.13% 310
not broken 70.59% 102
been broken before they were detected: more precisely, if we restrict our attention to the cases in which
conviction had a symmetric outcome, we still observe that in 76.22% of the detected cartels at least one
member undercut the agreed upon price before detection took place. Some players therefore probabily
decided non to communicate again because of a lack of trust that had already emerged before conviction.
On the other hand, table 6 shows that even if the cartel had not been previously broken, still about 30& of the
subjects chose not to communicate again. The number of observations is too small to make sound inference;
nonetheless we believe that the behavior of these players could be explained with reference to availability
heuristic: indeed, they behave as if the punishment recently experienced a⁄ected their perception of the level
of risk of liability.
5 Conclusion
Our experiment shows that strategic risk, availability heuristic and saliency bias have important e⁄ects on
cartel deterrence, though in general they are not taken into account in most of the theoretical analyses of low
19enforcement. This result, obtained through an explorative experiment ￿probably the ￿rst one in this ￿eld ￿
calls for further, more speci￿c experimental tests of the observed e⁄ects. A deeper and wider experimental
evidence could then support the development of a theoretical analysis of cartel deterrence which incorporates
strategic risk and the behavioral e⁄ects that have non-negligible e⁄ects according to our ￿ndings.
It would be also interesting to check whether our results are robust to a change in the framing of the
experiment, so to see if our conclusions can be extended to other kinds of organized crime, such as corruption,
fraud, auditor-manager collusion and corporate crime in general.
The interplay of rational considerations and behavioral biases in shaping deterrence of criminal activities
deserves our attention and is a promising area for future research. While substantially more evidence is
needed before drawing de￿nitive theoretical conclusions, the glimpse that our study o⁄ers hopefully is a
useful ￿rst step which will open the way for a rather new branch of experimental studies.
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